PAYING MEDICARE PROVIDERS 12 1 T he Reagan administration, as one of its most important initiatives to promote the market model, sought and implemented new competitive choices in Medicare that have the potential of transforming the entire program. Medicare now offers two options for paying providers, but the provider does not choose the payment method. In the early 1980s, beneficiaries started choosing between fee-for-service and risk-based systems for payments to providers. Health maintenance organizations (HMOs), long considered only the domain of basically healthy, employed populations, now are enrolling elderly Medicare beneficiaries under the Reagan-sponsored initiatives. This has made previously forbidden choices available to what is approaching half of all Medicare beneficiaries with HMOs in their area.
While many factors influence the choices beneficiaries make, the characteristics of risk-based plans and the characteristics of beneficiaries probably are among the most important determinants of the choice. The purpose of this article is to discuss the trends in enrollment in Medicare's new, risk-based option, the characteristics of those who choose this option compared to the fee-for-service system, and the issues related to the potential for savings to the Medicare program from risk-based contracting. The data are from the National Medicare Competition Evaluation, funded by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), covering primarily the experience of twenty HMOs and competitive medical plans (CMPs) that were the first to enter the Medicare market at risk.
We focus on only twenty plans, even though the provisions of the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) established the nationwide system of dual payment options under which more than 100 HMOs and CMPs now operate. The plans examined here are a selfselected group of plans that first entered the market as HCFA demonstration projects. We have followed their progress since their entry into the Medicare market and their conversion from demonstrations to regular risk-based plans under TEFRA. Elsewhere, we have reported on the similarity between the characteristics of plans that entered as demonstrations and the characteristics of HMOs in general that were in operation at the time. 1 We report first on the benefits observed for beneficiaries from the new dual-option system. Second, we provide the most recent report-available on the enrollment experience of the demonstrations and the TEFRA risk-based plans. Movement into and out of risk-based plans is relatively easy, and enrollments and disenrollments have been large in number. Third, we present a detailed description and discussion of the characteristics of HMO enrollees and nonenrollees. Then, the potential for savings and the sources of savings from having a dual payment system are 122 HEALTH AFFAIRS | Summer 1988 described, and the limited evidence on this issue is presented. We conclude that the dual-option program under Medicare offers beneficiaries the opportunity to improve their access to care and their satisfaction with care. However, potential savings to Medicare from the program depend on the payment methodology and on trends over time in how beneficiaries choose.
The Benefits To Beneficiaries
The standard Medicare program pays 75 percent of all Medicarecovered health care expenditures and 48 percent of total health care costs incurred by beneficiaries. 2 Medicare does not pay for preventive care, prescription drugs on an outpatient basis, routine vision and hearing services, or most long-term care expenses. To avoid substantial liability for out-of-pocket costs, over 70 percent of Medicare beneficiaries buy supplemental insurance. Consequently, most beneficiaries already are actively involved in choosing a Medicare supplement or alternative. Traditionally, Medicare has paid on a fee-for-service basis, and beneficiaries are expected to choose their own providers. According to our data, 13.5 percent of beneficiaries do not approach the task of provider choice in a systematic way, because they have no usual source of care.
The risk-based Medicare program, on the other hand, offers much more generous benefits than standard Medicare benefits. Prescription drugs were covered by all but two of the early demonstration plans, and many plans offered routine vision and hearing services, including eyeglasses and hearing aids. Cost-sharing requirements were much lower than under standard Medicare rules: there were no deductibles, and copayments tended to be very low or not required at all. Several plans did not require beneficiaries to pay premiums for the risk-based choice. When a premium was required, it was, in almost all cases, lower than the premium charged by traditional insurers. Most plans required the beneficiary to select a primary care physician, who was responsible for authorizing and organizing services. 3 A survey of beneficiaries throughout the country in risk-based plans found that expectation of lower out-of-pocket costs for obtaining health services was the primary reason for enrolling in an HMO for over half of respondents; another 20 percent indicated that the expanded benefits available through the HMO were the primary reason they enrolled. 4 Further analysis of the data suggested that financial access to care is improved for enrollees, particularly for beneficiaries who are most likely to be unable to afford health care. 5 Beneficiaries who are poor but not eligible for Medicaid, who do not have Medicare supplemental coverage, PAYING MEDICARE PROVIDERS 123 and who do not have a regular source of care were found to be four times more likely to join a Medicare HMO than were other beneficiaries. The evidence suggests that the Medicare risk-based program may have improved financial access to care for some Medicare beneficiaries. Whether this leads to increased service use, however, has not yet been shown.
The recent RAND study of access to care for low-income nonelderly enrollees in one HMO indicates that some Medicaid eligibles encountered barriers to access within the HMO that were difficult for them to surmount. A study under way by the Medical College of Virginia and Mathematica Policy Research as a part of HCFA's evaluation is examining beneficiaries' experience with HMO access barriers, based upon interviews with enrollees reporting symptoms and the responses of the HMO to enrollees' attempts to obtain services. Results of this study are expected soon.
Enrollment And Disenrollment
Unlike the employed population, which ordinarily must make one decision each year about their health insurance arrangements and then are locked into that choice until the next year, Medicare beneficiaries can move into and out of risk-based plans with notice only days or weeks in advance. This freedom to enroll and disenroll provides beneficiaries an opportunity to try out the HMO and, if they dislike aspects of the system or care provided, to resume their previous health care arrangements. The freedom-of-choice feature of the dual-choice system means that the satisfaction levels of both fee-for-service beneficiaries and risk-based beneficiaries should be quite comparable for a continuously enrolled population.
Exhibit 1 summarizes the number and percentage distribution of contracts and enrollees by HMO model type and profit status for the entire TEFRA program. By January 1988, HCFA had approved 133 plans to enter the risk-based market, and total TEFRA risk-based enrollment had reached 981,145 Medicare beneficiaries. As in the first year of the program, the majority of plans -62 percent-were traditional independent practice associations (IPAS), which tended to be smaller than other types of plans, accounting for about 53 percent of total enrollment. Group and staff models accounted for 47 percent of total enrollment and represented 38 percent of participating plans. This is not a change from the first year. For-profit plans were 42 percent of all TEFRA risk contracts and accounted for 41 percent of enrollees in January 1988.
While enrollments appear high, annual disenrollment rates from the early risk-based plans also appear high, although there are no comparable data for other population groups. Comparisons are difficult because open disenrollment at any time usually is not an option, without going through grievance procedures, for employment-based insurance. A further difficulty is that no perfectly analogous situation to disenrollment exists for fee-for-service beneficiaries. While beneficiaries in the fee-forservice sector may change physicians, this may only reflect a change in specialist care, which is not analogous to HMO disenrollment. This also may not involve a change in insurance, which disenrollment from a Medicare HMO involves. Changing physicians within the fee-for-service system also does not mean the payment system for providers changes, unlike HMO disenrollment. Three studies found that nearly 20 percent of the Medicare beneficiaries who were members of an early demonstration plan at any time during 1986 disenrolled, and that this was somewhat higher than the 16 percent observed in 1984 and 1985. 6 While the figures are high, to put them in context, it is also useful to point out that among the disenrollees surveyed in the first half of 1986, 26 percent had disenrolled to join another Medicare HMO. HCFA's aggregate data on enrollments and disenrollments are not organized to identify plan switchers, only to count a switcher one time as a disenrollee, and another time as an enrollee. Thus, we do not know to what extent the survey reflects the entire risk-based experience since disenrollment rates differed greatly across HMOs, from a low of 4 percent to a high of 39 percent.
A relatively high proportion of Medicare beneficiaries who disenrolled (45 percent) did so within the first three months after enrollment. 7 This pattern suggests that HMOs were failing to inform potential enrollees adequately of the lock-in feature of the plan and other aspects of HMO practice that may be unappealing to some beneficiaries, such as limited choice of provider. It is also possible that disenrollment in the first months may reflect high-pressure marketing practices that persuaded beneficiaries to join who then, on reflection, decided to cancel their enrollment.
Beneficiaries who appear more likely to be high users of services (for example, older, reporting a health problem) were more likely to disenroll. This pattern was consistent across plans and markets. High users had more encounters with the HMO delivery system and, therefore, may have more quickly identified areas of dissatisfaction. Those beneficiaries who have tastes for high use -irrespective of health status-may resist case-management pressures. Thus, disenrollments may lead to more favorable selection in HMOs.
If the current disenrollment rules under Medicare's dual-choice system offer a safety valve for dissatisfied Medicare beneficiaries, high disenrollment rates may indicate some degree of disruption in continuity of care and some degree of financial exposure for beneficiaries.. who cancel Medigap policies upon joining the HMO. Over 75 percent of Medicare beneficiaries who enroll in HMOs report having had private insurance prior to enrollment. Those who cancel that insurance may experience gaps in insurance coverage if they disenroll from the HMO. Analysis of interview data from HCFA's evaluation indicates that approximately one of three previously insured HMO enrollees has continued to maintain that insurance over a year after joining the HM0. 8 While 23 percent retain insurance because they receive it as a retirement benefit without cost to them, nearly 20 percent indicate that they maintain the coverage because they are uncertain about staying in the HMO or because they think it is worth paying the premium to have the security of extra coverage.
With Medicare supplemental coverage estimated to cost nearly $50 per month in 1988, some Medicare beneficiaries are paying a high price to protect themselves against the possibility of financial vulnerability if they choose to leave the HMO. Other beneficiaries who cancel their insurance after enrollment, however, may encounter high out-of-pocket costs for services they require after leaving the HMO, but before they can enroll in another private Medigap program. The catastrophic proposals under consideration by Congress may reduce the extent of financial vulnerability of disenrollees. Even so, an information dissemination program designed to help HMO enrollees to understand their insurance situation may be warranted.
Who Chooses Which Payment System?
As part of the National Medicare Competition Evaluation, a random sample of Medicare beneficiaries were surveyed on a wide range of personal characteristics and perceptions (Exhibit 2). The samples were selected from enrollees in the last three months of 1984, and respondents were interviewed twice: about six months after enrollment in a risk-based plan, and again about one year later. Three types of beneficiaries were interviewed: enrollees in seventeen risk-based plans and ten market areas throughout the country; nonenrollees who had the option to join an HMO in these same ten market areas but did not join; and a comparison group of fee-for-service beneficiaries in markets without risk-based plans at the initial interview, where the markets were matched to characteristics of the markets with risk-based plans.
There are many differences in the characteristics of those enrolling in the risk-based option compared to either nonenrollees or the fee-forservice comparison group. Residence in a nursing home is much less likely among enrollees. Some plans provide more generous coverage of nursing home costs than traditional Medicare because they view nursing homes as a low-cost substitute for hospital care, but nursing home care must be authorized by the plan. Plans do not market vigorously in nursing homes, and this is reflected in the data. Personal characteristics also are noteworthy with enrollees being less educated, more likely to be Hispanic, younger, and poorer than beneficiaries in the two fee-for-service groups. Enrollees were about half as likely as nonenrollees or the comparison beneficiaries to have an annual income of $25,000.
Enrollees were more likely to have had only one private insurance policy, less likely to have had group insurance, and less likely to pay no premium for their insurance compared to the fee-for-service beneficiaries. The coverage in their private insurance was less, too, with a lower percentage reporting added benefits beyond those that fill in Medicare's cost sharing, such as dental care, drugs, nursing and home health care, PAYING MEDICARE PROVIDERS 129 and eyeglasses. Enrollees were less likely to have a usual source of care or a regular physician compared to the fee-for-service respondents, with only 70.6 percent of enrollees reporting they had a regular physician, Only 68.2 percent of enrollees thought seeing the same physician was very important compared to 82.4 percent of nonenrollees and 77.7 percent of the comparison group. Enrollees are no less worried about their health, however, with 28.5 percent reporting they think they worry more about their health than other people, compared to 19.3 percent among the feefor-service group.
The last few results of the survey pertain to health status and the propensity. to use services. Unadjusted for the categories of age, sex, institutional status, and welfare status that are used to vary the monthly payment to Medicare HMOs, enrollees tended to report indicators that suggest they were healthier than the other two groups. Enrollees were less likely to have had a physical examination in the preceding year and were more likely to report that their health was excellent than were nonenrollees. While 8 percent of nonenrollees rated their health status as "poor," only 4.7 percent of enrollees gave this response.
These self-reported measures of health status are reinforced by the data on the level of Medicare reimbursements during the two-year period prior to HMO enrollments. Although comparison beneficiaries incurred reimbursed costs of $2,646 in the ten HMO market areas, enrollees in these seventeen HMOs incurred only $1,967 of reimbursable expense. 9 While these differences, in part, reflect the somewhat different characteristics (for example, age and sex) of enrollees and nonenrollees, there does appear to be a consistent pattern that suggests that enrollees may tend to be lower utilizers of health care than nonenrollees are.
Do Medicare HMOs Save Money?
Medicare's alternative system for paying providers may represent an opportunity to increase financial access to appropriate-quality care for Medicare beneficiaries while containing Medicare costs. If so, Medicare, beneficiaries, and HMOs that participate in Medicare all may benefit from this expansion of choices. The limited evidence available for the under-sixty-five population suggests that HMOs do save money, primarily by reducing hospital use. Most of the studies from which these findings are drawn, however, are based on the experience of a handful of well-established HMOs compared to new ones operating in 1988.
Biased selection. Whether HMOs save money for the Medicare program depends, in great part, on whether there is biased selection into The nature and extent of biased selection into Medicare HMOs have been investigated using data for preenrollment service use. 11 The assumption of these studies and others is that service use is correlated over time, and those that have high (low) service use before enrollment will have high (low) service use and costs after enrollment. The results, for two group-model HMOs and one IPA from the 1980 Medicare Capitation Demonstrations, suggest that the group-model HMOs experienced substantial favorable selection but that the IPA attracted enrollees who were representative of the market area. The 1980 demonstrations, however, had health screening surveys, and the HMOs were permitted to reject selectively beneficiaries who applied for enrollment. Biased selection may not be an inherent feature of the risk-based program, but merely a feature of certain market situations, marketing practices, and the limited number of HMOs for which data were available. Their nonrepresentative characteristics argue against a conclusion that biased selection necessarily will be a persistent problem for Medicare risk contracting in the long run.
Sources of savings. Beyond the biased selection issues, if Medicare HMOs actually save money, the sources of these savings are important to ensure that beneficiaries are receiving appropriate benefits and services and to enable the government to refine the payment methodology. Sources of savings include: (1) reduction in service use compared to feefor-service levels; (2) efficiencies in the provision of services that are not achieved by fee-for-service providers; and (3) negotiated price discounts from providers below fee-for-service levels. Through these mechanisms, HMOs may be able to provide appropriate-quality care to beneficiaries at a cost considerably below 95 percent of the AAPCC. Given the generosity of benefits, minimal cost sharing offered by most Medicare HMOs, and the relatively low premiums charged to beneficiaries, it would seem obvious that Medicare HMOs are providing all benefits for considerably less than 95 percent of the AAPCC. If the cost savings come from the sources above, and not from cutbacks in the appropriate level of quality care, HMOs probably will be able to continue to offer beneficiaries an Market responses. Beyond the potential direct savings for HCFA from beneficiaries who choose the risk-based option are the potential indirect savings for HCFA from increased competition in the markets in which Medicare HMOs operate. In fact, the indirect cost benefits from increased competition may be potentially much larger from the dual option now available than the direct benefits offered by HMO enrollment.
There are several market responses from fee-for-service providers that might account for a competitive cost impact. First, physicians may be more willing to accept assignment for Medicare claims to retain patients who otherwise might join an HMO. Second, providers might be more willing to join or form their own IPAs and preferred provider organizations (PPOs) to compete with established HMOs already in the risk-based market. Third, as more physicians gain experience with HMO practice patterns, their fee-for-service practice style may become more similar to the HMO pattern. While there is little solid evidence on the competitive effects of HMOs, most studies that have been done were based on pre-1980 experience and pertain to the employed population. The rapid growth and changes in the HMO industry in this decade suggest that competitive effects may be much more substantial today.
Discussion
Medicare's new dual system for paying providers offers beneficiaries a broader set of health care financing and delivery alternatives and, potentially, improved financial access to health services than has been available. The positive response of the HMO industry and of Medicare beneficiaries is evident by the unexpectedly rapid growth of the program since it was implemented in early 1985. Risk-based payments and case management may be the most effective mechanisms for ensuring financial access to appropriate quality of care, in an environment that includes strong pressures for cost containment. While not all Medicare beneficiaries will want to join HMOs, the competitive effects on fee-for-service providers may create additional positive responses that affect overall costs and practice patterns. As with any new program, experience leads to refinements and improvements to administrative procedures. But it is clear that the 1980s have seen the transformation of the Medicare program from a monolithic system of uniformity, to one with many more options for all concerned. 
